We study the behavior of U.S. markets both before and after U.S. Federal Open Market Commission (FOMC) meetings, and show that the announcement of a U.S. Federal Reserve rate change causes a financial shock, where the dynamics after the announcement is described by an analogue of the Omori earthquake law. We quantify the rate n(t) of aftershocks following an interest rate change at time T , and find power-law decay which scales as n(t − T ) ∼ (t − T ) −Ω , with Ω positive. Surprisingly, we find that the same law describes the rate n (|t − T |) of "pre-shocks" before the interest rate change at time T . This is the first study to quantitatively relate the size of the market response to the news which caused the shock and to uncover the presence of quantifiable preshocks. We demonstrate that the news associated with interest rate change is responsible for causing both the anticipation before the announcement and the surprise after the announcement. We estimate the magnitude of financial news by relating Ω to the relative difference between the U. S. Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate.
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Interest rate changes by the Federal Reserve provide a significant perturbation to financial markets, which we analyze from the perspective of statistical physics [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] . The Federal Reserve board (Fed), in charge of monetary policy as the central bank of the United States, is one of the most influential financial institutions in the world. During Federal Open Market Commission (FOMC) meetings, the Fed determines whether or not to change key interest rates. These interest rates serve as a benchmark and a barometer for both American and international economies. The publicly released statements from the scheduled FOMC meetings provide grounds for widespread speculation in financial markets, often with significant consequences.
In this paper, we show that markets respond sharply to FOMC news in a complex way reminiscent of physical earthquakes described by the Omori law [7, 8] . For financial markets, the Omori law was first observed in market crashes by Lillo and Mantegna [9] , followed by a further study of Weber et al. [10] , which found the same behavior in medium-sized aftershocks. However, the market crash is only an extreme example of information flow in financial markets. This paper extends the Omori law observed in large financial crises to the more common Federal Reserve announcements, and suggests that large market news dissipates via power-law relaxation (Omori law) of the volatility. In addition to the standard Omori dynamics following the announcement, we also find novel Omori dynamics before the announcement.
We analyze all scheduled FOMC meetings in the eight-year period 2000-2008 using daily data from http://finance.yahoo.com. Also, for the two-year period 2001-2002, we analyze the intraday behavior in the hours around the FOMC meetings with Trades And Quote (TAQ) data. First, we analyze the response of the S&P100, the top 100 stocks (by Sales) belonging to the 2002 S&P 500 index, over the 2000-2008 period using daily data. Using the relative spread between the 6-Month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate, we relate the speculation prior to the FOMC meetings to the daily market volatility, measured here as the logarithmic difference between the intraday high and low price for a stock on the day of the announcement. Next, we study high-frequency intraday TAQ data on the 1-min scale for the S&P100, and find an Omori law with positive exponent immediately following the announcement of Fed rate changes. Further, we relate the intraday market response, (quantified by the Omori exponent), to the change in market expectations before and after the announcement, (quantified by the relative spread between the 6-Month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate).
I. FOMC MEETINGS, FED INTEREST RATES AND TREASURY BILLS
There are many economic indicators that determine the health of the U.S. economy. In turn, the health of the U.S. economy sets a global standard due to the ubiquity of both the U.S. dollar and the economic presence maintained through imports, exports, and the Global Market [11] . The U.S. Federal Reserve Target rate, along with the Effective "overnight" rate, set the scale for interest rates in the United States and abroad. The Target rate is determined at FOMC meetings, which are scheduled throughout the year, with detailed minutes publicly released from these meetings. The Effective rate is a "weighted average of rates on brokered trades" between the Fed and large banks and financial institutions, and is a market realization of the Target rate. Refer to Our analysis focuses on the FOMC meetings after January 2000. Historically, the methods for releasing the meeting details have varied. In the 1990s, there was a transition from a very secretive policy towards the current transparent policy [12] . Since the year 2000, the Fed has released statements detailing the views and goals of the FOMC. This increase in public information has led to an era of mass speculation in the markets, revolving mainly around key economic indicators such as the unemployment rate, the Consumer Price Index, the money supply, etc. These economics indicators also influence the FOMC in their decision to either change or maintain key interest rates. Speculation has assumed many forms and new heights, evident in the implementation of new types of derivatives based on federal securities. For instance, options and futures are available at the Chicago Board of Trade which are based on Federal Funds, Treasury Bills, and Eurodollar foreign exchange. These contracts can be used to estimate the implied probability of interest rate changes, utilizing sophisticated methods focussed on the price movement of expiring derivative contracts [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] . In the next section, we outline a simple method to measure speculation prior to a scheduled FOMC meeting using the 6-Month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds Effective ("overnight") rate. These data are readily available and are updated frequently at the website of the Federal Reserve [18] . Because each FOMC meeting is met with speculation (in the weeks before the meeting) and anticipation (in the hours before the announcement), we identify the decision to change or not to change key interest rates as a market perturbation. The market response results from the systematic stress associated with the speculation and anticipation, which are not always in line with the FOMC decision.
II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS

A. Response to FOMC Meetings on Daily Time Scale
In this section we analyze the daily activity before and after 66 scheduled FOMC meetings over the 8-year period 2000-2008, where scheduled meetings are publicly announced at least a year in advance. We do not consider unscheduled meetings resulting in rate change, which contain an intrinsic element of surprise, and are historically infrequent (only 4 unexpected Target rate changes over the same period). Of primary importance, is the FOMC committee's decision to change or not change the Target rate R(t) by some fraction of a percent ∆R(t), where the absolute relative change |∆R(t)/R(t − 1)| has typically filled the range between 0.0 and 0.25. This section serves as an initial motivation for the intraday analysis, and will also serve as a guide in developing a metric that captures market speculation. We analyze the intraday high-low price range, which quantifies the magnitude of price fluctuations. In particular, we analyze the companies belonging to the S&P 100, and also the subset of 18 banking and finance companies referred to here as the "Bank" sector. In Fig. 1 we plot the trend of average daily volatility defined in Eq. [1] for the 10 days before and after the scheduled announcements. For a particular company around the i th scheduled FOMC meeting, we take the daily high price p hi (t i + ∆t), and the daily low price p lo (t i +∆t), for ∆t ∈ [−20, 20], where ∆t = 0 corresponds to t i , the day of the meeting. We then compute the highlow range for each trading day, r(t i +∆t) ≡ ln( p hi (ti+∆t) p lo (ti+∆t) ). For each company and each meeting, we scale the range by r , the average range over the 41-day time sequence centered around the meeting day, resulting in the normalized volatility v(t i + ∆t) ≡ r(t i + ∆t)/ r . Similarly, we use Φ(t i + ∆t), the time series for the volume traded over the same period, to compute a weight for each company corresponding to the normalized volume on the day of the FOMC meeting. We calculate this weight as φ i ≡ Φ(t i )/ Φ i , where Φ i is the average daily volume over the 41-day time sequence centered around the i th meeting day. Finally, we compute the weighted average volatility time series over all companies and all meetings,
(1)
We observe a peak in the average volatility v(∆t) on FOMC meeting days, ∆t = 0, with a more pronounced peak in the bank sector ( Fig. 1) . Companies in the bank sector are strongly impacted by changes in Fed rates, which immediately influence both their holding and lending rates. On average there is a 15-20% increase in volatility on days corresponding to FOMC meetings.
In order to quantify the impact of a single FOMC announcement on the day of the meeting t i , we define the average market volatility
Here, · · · i and (i) refer to the average and sum over records corresponding only to the i th FOMC meeting, respectively. Again, φ i ≡ Φ(t i )/ Φ is a normalized weight, where now Φ is the average daily volume over the entire 8-year period. In what follows, we develop a metric that is based on the 6-Month Treasury Bill, which quantifies the forward-looking prognosis of the economy by capturing the speculation in the market leading up to the i th FOMC announcement.
In Fig. S1 (A) we plot T (t), the time series for the 6-Month Treasury Bill, along with F (t), the Federal Funds Effective rate, and R(t), the Federal Funds Target rate, over the 8-year period beginning in January 2000. The relative spread between the 6-Month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate is an indicator of the future expectations of the Federal Funds Target rate [12] . Note that the 6-Month Treasury Bill has anticipatory behavior with respect to the Federal Funds Target (and hence Effective) rates. Other more sophisticated models utilize futures on Federal Funds and Eurodollar exchange, but these markets are rather new, and represent the highly complex nature of contemporary markets and hedging programs [13, 14, 15, 16, 17] . Hence, we use a simple and intuitive method for estimating market speculation and anticipation by analyzing the spread between the 6-Month Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate. Fig. S1 (B) exhibits the typical interplay between the 6-Month T-Bill and the Federal Funds Effective rate before and after a FOMC meeting. The change in the value of the Effective rate results from market speculation, starting approximately one trading week (5 trading days) prior to the announcement. This change follows from the forward-looking Treasury Bill, which in the example in Fig. S1 (B), is priced above the Federal Funds rate even 15 trading days before the announcement. In order to quantify speculation and anticipation in the market prior to each scheduled FOMC meeting, we analyze the time series δ(t) of the relative spread between F (t), the Federal Funds Effective rate, and T (t), the 6-Month T-bill,
which we plot in Fig. S1 (C) . In particular, we calculate the average relative spread over the period of L 1 = 15 days preceding the i th scheduled FOMC meeting. We weight the days in the L 1 -day period leading up to the FOMC meeting day exponentially, such that the relative spread on the ∆t th day before the announcement has the weight w(∆t) = e −∆t/λ . Without loss of generality, we choose the value of λ = 10 days corresponding to two trading weeks (see SI Text). We define the speculation metric,
which is a weighted average of δ(t) before the announcement, where the sums are computed over the range ∆t ∈ [1, L 1 ]. The metric Θ i for the i th FOMC meeting can be positive or negative, depending on the market's forward-looking expectations. In Fig. 2 we plot the average volatility V i of the SP100 versus Θ i (see Fig. S2 for the subset of 18 banking companies). We observe that for negative values of Θ i , when the price of the 6-Month T-Bill is greater on average than the Federal Funds Effective rate, and the market is expecting a rate increase, the market response tends to be less volatile. Conversely, for larger positive values of Θ i , which corresponds to T (t) < F (t) and expectations of a rate cut, there tends to be larger market fluctuations. Hence, the market responds differently to falling and rising rates, where the direction in rate change often reflects the overall health of the economy as viewed by the FOMC. However, there is also a tendency for large average volatility even when Θ i is small, possibly stemming from the extreme surprise characteristic of some FOMC decisions. In these cases, more sophisticated methods are needed to improve the predictions of market movement.
B. Intraday response to FOMC decision via an Omori Law
In the previous section we studied the market response on the daily scale. Now we ask the question, "What is the intraday response to FOMC news?" Here we analyze the TAQ data over the 2-year period Jan. 1, 2001 to Dec. 31, 2002 . The reported times for the FOMC announcement are listed in Table S1 . Inspired by the non-stationary nature of financial time series, methods have been developed within the framework of non-equilibrium statistical mechanics to describe phenomena ranging from volatility clustering [19, 20, 21] to financial correlation matrices [22, 23, 24] . We use the Omori law, originally proposed in These values correspond to FOMC decisions to maintain interest rate levels (∆R = 0), and suggest a fundamental difference in the dynamics following decisions to change versus decisions not change the Federal Funds Target rate. Limited by the size of our data set, we neglect this difference. Although the correlation between Θi and Vi is dominated by noise, it is nevertheless supporting that the regression captures the crossover at (θ, V ) = (0, 1). Including all data points, the regression correlation coefficient r 2 is 0.34, and the slope of the regression is α = 0.36 ± 0.13. Restricting data points corresponding only to interest rate changes (red and green triangles), r 2 = 0.48 and α = 0.37 ± 0.12 (this regression is not shown and is indistinguishable from the regression including all data points). Both linear regressions pass the ANOVA F-test, rejecting the null hypothesis that α = 0 at the 0.05 significance level.
1894 to describe the relaxation of after-shocks following earthquakes, to describe the response of the market to FOMC announcements. Defined in Ref. [9] , the Omori law quantifies the rate n(t) of large volatility events following a singular perturbation at time T . The shock may be exogenous (resulting from external news stimuli) or endogenous (resulting from internal correlations, e.g. "herding effect") [25, 26, 27, 28, 29] . This rate is defined as,
where Ω is the Omori power-law exponent. We study the frequency of events greater than a volatility threshold q, using the high-frequency intraday price time series p(t).
The intraday volatility (absolute returns) is expressed as v(t) ≡ | ln(p(t)/p(t − δt))|, where we use δt = 1 minute.
To compare stocks, we scale each raw time series in terms of the standard deviation over the entire period analyzed, and then remove the average intraday trading pattern as described in Ref. [10] . This establishes a universal volatility threshold q, in units of standard deviation, for all companies analyzed. In the analysis that follows, we focus on N (|t − T |), the cumulative number of events above threshold q,
which is less noisy compared to n(|t − T |). Using N (|t − T |) we examine the intraday market dynamics for the S&P100, before (t < T ) and after (t > T ) the i th FOMC announcement at T i , which typically occurs at 2:15 PM ET (285 minutes after the opening bell) for scheduled meetings (see SI Text).
In Fig. 3 we plot typical intraday trading patterns corresponding to N (t). It is clear that the clustering of volatility begins at the reported time of the announcement (note the abrupt change at t = 285 minutes in Figs. 4 A-C). Volatility clustering in financial data sampled at the 1-minute scale persists for several months, with a significant crossover in the observed power-law autocorrelations occurring around 600 minutes (≈ 1.5 days) [30, 31, 32] . In Figs. 3(A,B) we plot the average volatility response corresponding to the S&P100 on 05/15/01. This average,
is obtained by combining the individual Omori responses, N j (t), of S companies. Such averaging does not cancel the Omori law, but allows for better statistical regression. This is especially useful for an Omori law corresponding to large volatility threshold q, where a single company might not have a sufficient number of events. In Fig.  3 (C) we plot the trade pattern N (t) of Merrill Lynch on Tuesday 08/21/01, and also in Fig. S7(B) for the following three days, demonstrating that the Omori relaxation can persists for several days. In order to compare the dynamics before and after the announcement, we first separate the intraday time series N (t) into two time series N b (t|t < T ), and N a (t|t > T ). Then, to treat the dynamics symmetrically around the i th intraday announcement time T i [29, 33] , we define the displaced time τ = |t − T i | ≥ 1 as the temporal distance from the minute T i (see SI Text). As an illustration, we plot in Fig. 4 the time series exhibited in Fig. 3(A) for S&P 100, as a function of displaced time τ . We then employ a linear fit to both N b
on a log-log scale to determine the Omori power-law exponents Ω b before the news and Ω a after the news. In analogy, we define the amplitude β before as β b and after as β a , as defined in Eq. [6] .
Typically Ω a > 0, which reflects the pronounced increase in the rate of events above the volatility threshold q after the time of the announcement. Also, the amplitudes of the Omori law generally obey the inequality β b < β a , resulting from the large response immediately following the news. Note that Ω = 0 corresponds to a constant rate of events exceeding the threshold q. Also, Ω ≡ Ω(q) increases with q.
Although we focus mainly on price volatility v(t) in this paper, we also observe Omori dynamics in the high- frequency volume time series ω(t), defined as the cumulative number of shares traded in minute t. In Figs. 5 (S&P 100) and S3 (bank sector) we compare the average of Omori exponents Ω b and Ω a for both volatility and volume dynamics, with threshold value q = 3. We compute the average Omori exponents using two averaging methods, the "individual" method and the "portfolio" method.
To analyze the time series N a i after the announcement, we first average the individual exponents Ω a obtained for each company, yielding Ω a . This "individual" method provides an error bar corresponding to the sample standard deviation σ(Ω a ). The second "portfolio" method determines a single Ω a from the averaged portfolio N i in Eq. [7] . Comparing the open-box (individual method) and closed-box (portfolio method) symbols in Fig. 5 , we observe that both methods yield approximately the same average value of Ω a . Note that for the subset i = {1,4,8} of the unscheduled FOMC meetings, Ω a is smaller than usual, capturing the intense activity following surprise announcements. Hence, unexpected FOMC announcements can produce an inverse Omori law exhibiting convex relaxation (Ω a < 0) over a short horizon if the news contains a large amount of inherent surprise. The 8th meeting corresponds to the opening of the markets after Sept. 11, 2001. For the time series N b i before the announcement, individual companies often do not have sufficient activity to provide accurate power-law fits. Hence, to estimate the sample standard deviation σ(Ω b ), we produce partial combinations,
i (τ ), using M = 5. We then average over the exponents Ω b extracted from the partial combinations, providing an estimate of the sample standard deviation, σ(Ω b ), and yielding the error bars for Ω b in Fig. 5 . We also perform the complete portfolio method for N b i (τ ) (see Fig. S4 ) , which extracts a single Ω b from the portfolio response in the limit M = S. Again, the average values of Ω b between the two methods are consistent. The values of Ω b calculated from volume data are all close to zero. However, using the Student T-test we reject the null hypothesis that each mean value Ω b is equal to zero at the p = 0.01 confidence level for 15 out of 17 dates.
In Fig. S5(A) we compare the values of Ω a after the announcement for 5 sectors and for volatility threshold q = 3. We observe that the differences in the average values of the sectors are fairly small, indicating a broad market response. We also observe that the technology sector (Tech.), composed of hardware, software, and IT companies, often has the largest average value Ω a . Larger exponents, which correspond to shorter relaxation times, could result from the intense trading in the Tech sector during the Tech/IT bubble, which peaked in the year 2000. In order to compare the variation in the individual values of Ω a , we plot the pdf of exponents for all companies and meetings in Fig. S5(B) using the shifted variable x ≡ (Ω a − Ω a i ). We conclude from a Ztest at the 0.0005 confidence level that Tech sector Omori exponents are larger on average, x T ech > x SP 100 .
Motivated by the metric Θ i defined in Eq. [4] , which quantifies speculation and anticipation in the market preceding FOMC meetings, we now develop a second metric to describe surprise through the change in market speculation following the announcement. This metric ∆ i compares the anticipation leading up to the announcement with the revised speculation following the FOMC decision. This can be quantified through the relative change in δ(t), which provides a rough measure of the market stress that is released in the small financial shock. Qualitatively, ∆ i relates the average value of the spread before and after the i th scheduled meeting. We define,
where the sum is computed over the range ∆t ∈ [1, L 2 ] trading days, with L 2 = 15 trading days and λ 2 = 10 trading days. The factor S(∆R i ) = 1 when the Fed increases or maintains the Target rate R(t), while S(∆R i ) = −1 when the Fed decreases the Target rate.
In Figs. 6 and S6 we relate the amplitudes β b and exponents Ω a,b to the anticipation metric Θ and the surprise metric ∆, developed in this paper. For both metrics, we observe trends that are consistent with the framework of this news-oriented theory of market response dynamics. First, we observe that larger anticipation and surprise (revised speculation) coincide with larger amplitude β b of the foreshock dynamics. We also find that smaller Omori exponents Ω b , corresponding to a longer buildup of foreshocks, also accompany announcements with large Θ and ∆. In the case of aftershocks, we observe smaller relaxation exponents Ω a , representing slower decay of the aftershocks, following large market perturbations as measured by Θ and ∆.
III. DISCUSSION
Information flows through various technological avenues, keeping the ever-changing world up-to-date. All news carries some degree of surprise, where the perceived magnitude of the news certainly depends on the recipient. In financial markets, where speculation on investment returns results annually in billions of dollars in transactions, news plays a significant role in perturbing the complex financial system both on large and small scales, reminiscent of critical behavior with divergent correlation lengths [34] . Perturbations to the financial system are easily transmitted throughout the market by the longrange interactions that are found in the networks of mar-ket correlations [22, 23, 24] . Afterwards, the effects of the perturbation may persist via the long-term memory observed in volatility time series [30, 31, 32] , with fluctuation scaling obeying the emperical Taylor's law [35, 36] .
We have shown that the Omori law describes the dissipation of information following the arrival of Federal Open Market Commission (FOMC) news. This type of relaxation is consistent with the substructure of Omori laws found on all scales in Ref. [10] . In particular, we systematically study the dynamical response of the stock market to perturbative information in the form of a Federal Reserve FOMC interest rate announcements, which can be expected (scheduled) or unexpected (as in cases of emergency). Our findings suggest that the dynamics of "rallies" based on other forms of news, such as earning reports, upgrades and downgrades of stocks by major financial firms, unemployment reports, merging announcements etc., might also be governed by the Omori law describing the decay of market aftershocks in both price volatility and volume traded, and possibly even the bid-ask spread [33, 37] . Recently, Joulin et al. [27] use a similar method to describe the relaxation of trading following news streaming from feeds such as Dow Jones and Reuters, and compare to the relaxation following anomalous volatility jumps. Joulin et al. [27] also find Omori law relaxation, with exponent Ω ≈ 1 following a news source, and Ω ≈ 0.5 following an endogenous jump; interestingly, they find that the amplitude of the Omori law is larger for news sources than for endogenous jumps. For further comparison, Weber et al. [10] find Ω ≈ 0.69 for the 38 days following the market crash on September 11 1986. One distinct difference between these studies, is the source of the news: Joulin et. al pool together thousands of news sources, some possibly pertaining to only a single company; we focus on one particular type, the FOMC Target rate decision, which is broad in its impact on the whole market and the economy. It is possible that the difference between anticipated news and idiosyncratic news is the important criterion to consider when analyzing market response functions in relation to exogenous events.
In the case of FOMC news, speculation can be quantified by measuring the relative difference between the effective Federal Funds rate and the Treasury Bill in the weeks leading up to a scheduled meeting. We develop a speculation metric, Θ, and relate it to V , the volatility on the day of the meetings, finding that the market behaves more erratically when the Treasury Bill predicts a decrease in the Federal Funds Target rate. The Omori exponents, Ω b and Ω a , which quantify the market's dynamical response to FOMC news, are further related to the market's anticipation and surprise on the day of the FOMC meeting.
We develop ∆, a simple metric to quantify surprise, quantified by the difference in the average relative spread between the Treasury Bill and the Federal Funds rates, before and after the meeting. We relate ∆ to the dynamical response of the market on the day of the meeting, quantified by the Omori exponent Ω a . Large values of ∆ represent large shifts in market speculation, which are accompanied by smaller Omori exponents, indicating a longer relaxation time. In all, these results show that markets relax according to the Omori law following large crashes and Federal interest rate changes, suggesting that the perturbative response of markets belongs to a universal class of Omori laws, independent of the magnitude of news.
Supporting Information
V. METHODS
For the calculation of Θ and ∆, we choose values of L and λ to be on the order of a couple trading weeks prior to the announcement, so that we isolate fresh speculation leading into the meeting. The parameter λ provides an effective cutoff period, after which the weights begin to decrease quickly. Conversely, the weights corresponding to days close to the meeting, ∆t = 0, are effectively constant. The values of Θ and ∆ do not change much with varying choice of L ∈ [5, 15] or λ ∈ [5, 15] . Without loss of generality, we choose L = 15 days, and λ = 10 days.
We find historical information about FOMC meetings using resources at the Federal Reserve websit and using newspaper archives. Intraday time of announcement, T , are often quoted in New York Times finance articles by Richard W. Stevenson the day after FOMC. They are also evident in the intraday Omori plots of N (t) in Fig. 3 .
In Fig. 3 we plot N (t), where t = 0 corresponds to the opening bell at 9:30 AM. Quantitatively, we calculate the Omori exponents using the displaced time τ from the announcement time T . In terms of the displaced time τ ≡ |t − T i |, we separate N i (t) into two separate time series
The parameter p is a "padding" that eliminates the last 60 minutes of N b i (τ ) (the first 60 minutes of N i (t)), which eliminates opening effects and improves the regression analysis around T i . ). A large value of Θi reflects the high probability that an interest rate change will happen. Interestingly, there are many instances where Θi ≈ 0, followed by a large change on the announcement dates. These values correspond to FOMC decisions to maintain interest rate levels (∆R = 0), and suggest a fundamental difference in the dynamics following decisions to change versus decisions to not change the Federal Funds Target rate. Limited by the size of our data set, we neglect this difference. Although the correlation between Θi and Vi is dominated by noise, it is nevertheless supporting that the regression captures the crossover at (θ, V ) = (0, 1). Including all data points, the regression correlation coefficients r 2 = 0.30 and the slope of the regression is α = 0.54 ± 0.22. Restricting data points corresponding only to interest rate changes (red and green triangles), the r 2 = 0.40 and α = 0.53 ± 0.21 (this regression is not shown, and is indistinguishable from the regression including all data points). Both linear regressions pass the ANOVA F-test, rejecting the null hypothesis that α = 0 at the 0.05 significance level. 
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